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Abstract: The U.S. mortgage loan foreclosure crisis has been called “the worst financial crisis 
since the great depression.” There are two distinct channels of influence of the subprime 
problem. The first is the rise in foreclosures that affects homeowners and the real estate 
industry most directly.  The second channel is financial, flowing from the effects on lenders’ 
financial viability and on financial markets. The timing of developments in these two channels 
will determine how fast markets work through these problems and restore stability and growth 
to the nation’s housing and financial markets. The problem is rooted in the housing market, and 
this market is likely to be very slow to adjust. It takes time for good mortgages to go bad and 
to then move through to the end of the foreclosure process. While financial markets work much 
more quickly, they will be held hostage to the unfolding effects of the foreclosures in the 
housing markets and among lenders. Mortgage loan related losses will continue along with 
foreclosures over the next year or so and these losses will plague firms even if they have 
already taken adequate write-downs on their asset values. Complicating the picture is the 
response of the Federal Reserve, which has reacted chaotically by creating new lending 
programs that have transformed its credit supply from government securities to private financial 
institutions, and in the process, violated the first rule of central banking to lend liberally in a 
liquidity crisis. This failure, compounded by providing a backstop to questionable securities, has 
slowed market adjustment and risks lengthening and deepening the financial crisis. This paper 
reviews the emergence of the foreclosure crisis and its real impacts in the economy, the 
financial market effects of the surge in mortgage foreclosures, the monetary policy response to 
the problem, and provides an assessment of the outlook for the crisis.   
 
About the Author: John A. Tatom is the Director of Research at Networks Financial Institute 
at Indiana State University and Associate Professor of Finance at Indiana State University. He 
has published widely on international and domestic monetary and fiscal policy issues, especially 
inflation, capital formation, productivity and growth; the macroeconomics of supply, especially 
oil and energy price shocks; the relationship of exchange rate movements to international 
competitiveness, capital flows, trade, and international economic policy; and on financial 
innovations and their effects on monetary policy and the economy, among other areas. 
 
Keywords: Mortgage foreclosure, credit crunch, credit channel, subprime lending. 
JEL Classification: E44, E 50, G21 
An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the International Banking, Economics and Finance Association meetings, 
Honolulu, Hawaii, June 30, 2008.  The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily 
reflect official positions of Networks Financial Institute. Please address questions regarding content to John A. Tatom 
at john.tatom@isunetworks.org. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. NFI working papers and 
other publications are available on NFI’s website (www.networksfinancialinstitute.org).  Click “Research” and then 
“Publications/Papers.”  
  1 
    
The U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: A Two-Pronged Assault on the U.S. Economy 
John A. Tatom * 
 
The U.S. mortgage loan foreclosure crisis is the biggest problem the U.S. economy has faced 
since the last recession and indeed it has been called “the worst financial crisis since the great 
depression.”1  In August 2007, the National Association of Business Economics named the 
combined effects of subprime debt defaults and excessive personal and corporate debt as the 
greatest short-term threat to the U.S. economy and this problem has continued to top the list 
since.  There are two distinct channels of influence of the subprime problem that raise concern. 
The first is the rise in default and foreclosure that affects homeowners, lenders, neighborhoods 
and the real estate industry most directly.  The second channel is financial, flowing from the 
effects on lenders’ financial viability and on financial markets. The second channel has been 
more visible and dominant in popular discussions of the issues since early August 2007. These 
are the direct channels of influence of the crisis. There are ancillary effects on balance sheets and 
prices that affect economic behavior and thereby influence financial and goods and services 
markets. These indirect effects are also discussed here, but the focus is on the direct effects.   
  
The timing of developments in these two channels will determine how fast consumers and 
business work through these problems and restore stability and growth to the nation’s housing 
and financial markets. The bottom line is that the problem is rooted in housing markets and these 
markets are likely to be very slow to adjust and to eliminate difficulties. It takes time for good 
mortgages to go bad and for bad mortgages to move from delinquency in payments to the 
initiation of the foreclosure process.  It also takes time from initiation of the process until the 
process ends with the sale of a property to a new owner and the distribution of the losses to 
affected parties. Thus no matter how quickly financial markets adjust, the effects of the 
foreclosure problem, even those working though financial markets, will continue to play out for 
at least another year. 
  
While financial markets work much more quickly, they will be held hostage to the unfolding 
effects of the foreclosures in the housing markets and among lenders. Asset pricing is forward 
looking, which means that buyers and sellers of financial instruments base the value of assets on 
the future cash flows expected from assets and today’s estimates of the risks associated with 
realizing those expected cash flows. Thus, for example, financial markets process a spike in the 
default rate on home mortgages into the value of mortgages and related assets very quickly.  
Firms are failing because of the changes in asset prices or because they are unable to meet the 
financial demands of their creditors. They will continue to do so as realizations of losses and 
their location in the global marketplace unfold.  Unfortunately these losses will arise in the 
mortgage loan sector as defaults and foreclosure continue to rise over the next year or so, but 
also the losses will plague firms that hold these loans or related securities as major assets, even if 
they have taken write-downs on asset values already or in the next few months. 
                                                          
*The author is grateful to Martha McCormick and Nick Ochieng for their research support and to David Mayes for 
his comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The usual caveat applies. An earlier version of this paper was prepared 
for the International Banking, Economics and Finance Association meetings, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 30, 2008.  
  
 1 See Reinhart, (2008a). 
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This paper reviews the emergence of the foreclosure crisis and its real impacts in the economy in 
Section I.  Section II takes up the financial market effects of the surge in mortgage foreclosures, 
including the loss of capital by financial institutions, potential effects on credit supply and on the 
economy.  In Section III the monetary policy response to the problem is discussed and evaluated.   
The paper concludes with an assessment of the outlook for the crisis.   
 
I. The foreclosure problem 
The national foreclosure problem did not become very visible until late 2006. The foreclosure 
rate had been fairly steady at about one percent from II/2005 to II/2006, but then it rose slightly 
to 1.05 percent in III/2006 and to 1.19 percent in IV/2006. By the end of 2007 it had climbed to 2 
percent and reached 2.47 percent in the first quarter of 2008 (see chart 1). In this paper, the 
foreclosure rate is the share of mortgages that are in the foreclosure process (inventory).  Some 
analysts prefer to use the new foreclosure starts rate instead, but it is the total inventory in 
foreclosure that represents the foreclosure problem, especially with regard to its impact on 
housing starts and prices of homes. Of course the foreclosure rate as defined here could rise 
simply by slowing down the process of moving mortgages from filing to settlement, but this 
process is fairly stable and averages slightly over one year.  Thus the foreclosure rate is a 
multiple of the rate of new foreclosures, which is also shown in the chart.2 
  
Chart 1 
The foreclosure problem began in 2006 
Foreclosure measures have been rising since 2006 
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Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
Subprime loans, which are loans to borrowers with relatively low credit scores and records of 
                                                          
2 Crews Cutts and Merrill (2008) discuss the various processes used by states to move homes through foreclosure.  
They find that the U.S average is a little over a year from first filing to completion of the foreclosure process.  
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poor credit performance or little credit experience, have become an increasing share of all 
mortgages in this decade and currently make up about 13 percent of such loans. In 2000 and 
earlier, subprime loans were negligible. Other higher risk mortgages today include credit 
extended by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and so-called “alt-A” loans, which are 
loans to borrowers usually with prime credit scores, but who do not provide any documentation 
(“no-doc”) of income or wealth or ability to service pay the loan, or very little documentation 
(“low-doc”).  They have been reported to constitute over 10 percent of all mortgages. When all 
three categories are added together, nearly 30 percent of loans outstanding are estimated to be in 
the high-risk category. 
 
Subprime loans have foreclosure rates that are much higher than that for prime loans (Table 1). 
Risky loans, without considering alt-A loans, make up about 53 percent of the loans in 
foreclosure. At the end of the first quarter of 2008, 10.7 percent of subprime loans were in 
foreclosure and this rate is expected to rise to 12 percent, about the share already registered in 
some high-foreclosure Midwestern states. The foreclosure problem would not be so noticeable if 
the share of such risky loans had not exploded since 2003. At the last peak in foreclosures in 
2001, only 2.7 percent of loans were subprime, according to Mortgage Bankers Association data. 
In early 2008, it was 12.3 percent, down from a peak of 14.0 percent in the second quarter of 
2007. The subprime problem is largely an adjustable rate problem.  As shorter-term interest 
rates, to which adjustable rate loans are typically tied, rose in 2004-2006, prime borrowers and 
even better-advised FHA borrowers shifted to fixed mortgage rate loans. About 80 percent of 
prime borrowers and about 90 percent of FHA borrowers have fixed rate loans. In contrast, 58 
percent of subprime borrowers have adjustable-rate loans.  These loans represent the highest 
foreclosure risk. While it is common to refer to the current foreclosure problem as the 
“subprime” or “adjustable-rate subprime” crisis, it is important to bear in mind that the 
foreclosure rate for prime loans, especially alt-A loans, is also rising and represent an important 
component of the problem.     
 
Table 1  
U.S. foreclosures in the first quarter 2008  
  Foreclosure rate 
Loans 
serviced 
Loans in 
foreclosure 
Percent of 
loans serviced 
Percent of 
foreclosed 
loans 
Prime 1.22 35,311,975 430,806  78.1 38.6 
Subprime 10.74 5,542,954 595,313  12.3 53.3 
FHA 2.4 3,256,579 78,158  7.2 7.0 
All loans 2.47 45,224,567 1,117,047  100.0 100.0 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
 
The causes of the crisis 
A key forerunner of the mortgage crisis is the decline in the demand for housing, including both 
a decline in housing starts and slowing in house price appreciation.  Chart 2 shows the housing 
starts and the rate of increase of housing prices measured by the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). The pace of house price slowing has not slowed so far, but that 
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of starts seems to be slowing.  Some would argue that the slowing in price appreciation was a 
key cause in the foreclosure crisis as many investors, especially subprime borrowers, had 
reportedly entered contracts that were only viable if house prices continued their rapid 
appreciation and borrowers could refinance based on their higher expected equity. Another 
group, similarly affected, was speculators who bought in order to flip the purchases at higher 
prices.  Once price appreciation became questionable or disappeared, they walked away from 
their mortgages.  A third group were buyers who found that they had negative equity after prices 
began falling in some markets and who had cheaper rental or purchase housing alternatives 
elsewhere.   
 
Chart 2 
House prices began to slow in fall 2005 and housing starts peaked by January 2006 
The decline in the housing market 
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  Sources: OFHEO and U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Mian and Sufi (2008) argue that an increase in supply of mortgages by non-traditional suppliers 
in 2001-2005, what they curiously call “disintermediation” or sales of mortgages shortly after 
origination, resulted in a large fraction of the home price appreciation and the subsequent rise in 
defaults.  The appreciation presumably played a large role in attracting borrowers expecting 
further gains.  Timing is everything however, as Girardi, Shapiro and Willen (2008) argue that it 
was the bust in house prices that caused the rise in defaults. Perhaps they are all correct and the 
rise in non-traditional sources of mortgage credit explained the dynamics of house prices, both 
up and then down, and as the latter occurred, foreclosures spiked up. Demyanyk and Hemert 
(2008) take a different view; their results show that credit quality deteriorated for both adjustable 
rate and fixed rate subprime loans steadily from 2001 to 2006 after adjusting for price changes, 
and for borrower and loan characteristics.  
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Another factor that influenced the surge in housing starts and prices in 2004-05, and may have 
contributed to the subsequent defaults, was the decline in the real interest rate. Some have argued 
that this was caused by the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) low federal funds rate target of 1 percent 
from late-June 2003 to late-June 2004. But the housing market and prices actually boomed most 
in the rest of 2004 and 2005, despite a rising federal funds rate target.  By the peak of the 
housing market in late 2005 and early 2006, the federal funds target rate was rising from about 4 
percent to 4.25 percent and at the end of January 2006 it was set at 4.5 percent. More 
importantly, throughout the period of the rising and then constant federal funds rate, from July 
2005 to August 2007, there was little change in long-term interest rates or fixed rate mortgage 
interest rates (Chart 3).  Just as a higher federal funds rate did not affect the mortgage rate, 
neither did the low rates.  Indeed the monthly average real long-term 30-year mortgage rate was 
falling throughout the period so that mortgage rates were higher during the 2004-05 boom and 
lower subsequently.3  From July 2004 when the federal funds rate began to rise to its peak in 
July 2007, the real mortgage rate averaged 3.37 percent, a full point below the 4.40 percent 
average during the previous 37 months of very low federal funds rates from June 2001 to June 
42004.    
Real conventional mortgage rates were not lowered by low federal funds rates 
 
Chart 3 
The federal funds rate has had little effect on long-term interest rates
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ource: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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3 The real mortgage rate is the 30-year conventional rate less the expected inflation, which is proxied by inflation 
over the past 12 months measured with the chain personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator.  
4 The 10-year Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) rate was also lower than it had been during the period of 
declining and low federal funds rates and did not rise until after the peak in the housing market.  It does not show the 
temporary spike from October 2006 to August 2007 that occurs with the real mortgage rate shown in Chart 3.  
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Of course adjustable rate loans had rates that moved in line with short-term rates such as th
year Treasury yield and the federal funds rate.  For adjustable rate borrowers who did not 
correctly assess the prospects of affordability and default when these rates reset, it is likely that 
the federal funds rate level strengthened demand for housing early on and weakened it later.  It is
difficult to blame the Fed for the poor financial judgment or ignorance on the part of borrowers 
and lenders, and it is even more difficult to determine how the Fed could have carried out their 
e two-
 
ccessful stimulus and restraint without such unintended effects on adjustable rate borrowers.   
 
ed 
e 
ted to high risk-high return 
curities and this demand benefited the riskiest borrowers most.     
it 
 
ill 
y high subprime 
tes unaffordable, even if short-term interest rates remain the same or fall.5 
e 
 raise 
rs 
ge payments, but not the higher ones, and their 
nders, to take action to avoid this spike.    
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Another financial factor that contributed to the spike in foreclosures is that many mortgage 
lenders benefited from the underpricing of mortgage credit by avoiding a large piece of the cost
of capital.  Large banks created structured finance positions in Structured Investment Vehicles 
(SIVs) at their holding companies and did not face the capital charges that they would have fac
by keeping these positions on their banking books. These SIVs created a market for mortgag
backed securities and lowered the interest rates that originators faced in creating new risky 
mortgages. These structured finance positions were especially attrac
se
 
It will get worse due to the importance of subprime resets 
Regardless of the cause, the origins of the problem date back to 2004-2006 when a large share of 
new mortgage loans were made to subprime borrowers, borrowers who had relatively low cred
scores and could not qualify for conventional mortgage loans at normal market interest rates.  
Many of these loans began to default much earlier than the normal experience from the past (see 
Demyanyk and Hemert 2008, for example). In fact, some of them went into default without ever
making a payment. As the marginal adjustable-rate loans begin to adjust in coming months and 
for the next year or so, the foreclosure rate is expected to spike further. Many of these loans w
have interest rates that adjust up from low “teaser” rates, making their alread
ra
  
According to the Financial Times (September 26, 2007), the average adjustable rate mortgag
was offered at 7 percent in 2005-06.  These loans will reset to 9.45 to 10.85 percent in their 
initial reset, according to Deutsche Bank and Loan Performance.  Such an increase would
principal and interest payments from $ 665.30 to $837.21 to $941.06 for each $100,000 
borrowed, or 25 to 41 percent.  These rates are expected to spike in the 12-18 months beginning 
in November 2007.  This also highlights that the time is short for the portion of these borrowe
who currently can afford their current mortga
le
  
The U.S. Treasury has created the Hope Alliance with major lenders who voluntarily freeze
teaser rates for up to five years to lessen the impact of the crisis.  But only lenders who ar
current on their loan payments and can afford their teaser rates can qualify for help. The 
Administration also secured legislation in August 2007 to improve the potential for the Fed
Housing Administration (FHA) to guarantee refinanced subprime adjustable rate loans fo
borrowers who can afford the current fixed mortgage rate.  Congress is also working on 
legislation that will make it easier for homeowners with subprime loans to refinance with fixe
5 Sherlund (2008) estimates that the peak in foreclosures will come in spring or summer 2008, and that the 
foreclosure started rate will not decline much until 2009.    
 7
rate FHA, if they can qualify.  This program is expected to benefit about 200,000 to 300,000 
orrowers, but the magnitude of the problem will far exceed this. 
r 
ise 
 
 and Freddie Mac have had no effect on such access, despite that being their 
incipal mission. 
 
s 
e slowing in the pace of decline, there is little evidence that the end 
f the decline is imminent.  
s 
e because the share of housing expenditures in real GDP is 
 small, currently about 4 percent. 
l investment growth has plummeted since 2005, but is a small share of the 
conomy 
 
b
 
The Federal Reserve has also issued a request for comments on new proposed regulation that 
would make it difficult for borrowers and lenders to repeat many of their mistakes from the past.  
As future comments and actions will show, however, these proposals will make it more costly o
impossible for low-income first-time buyers to access credit markets to obtain financing, yet it 
was these opportunities for unconventional finance that led millions of borrowers, who otherw
would not have been able to buy homes, to successfully transition into home ownership. For 
example, Gerardi, Rosen and Willen (2007) find that borrowers today are more able to access 
housing based on their long-term expected income than they have been earlier because of new 
innovations on credit markets.  This possibility could be taken away by new rules proposed by
the Fed. Interestingly, they also find that the growth of the government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) Fannie Mae
pr
  
Most estimates of the impact of foreclosure on the housing market show that it has reduced the
growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) by about one percentage point since spring 
2006; with the continuing drops in housing starts, this effect is expected to be no larger than thi
through the end of 2008. Housing starts peaked in late 2005 and January 2006, when starts hit 
2.3 million per year.  Since then, starts have plummeted nearly in half, to about one million since 
fall 2007.  While there is som
o
 
Chart 4 shows that real residential fixed investment has been declining since early 2006 and the 
pace of decline has been relatively large. The impact on GDP however has remained small and i
likely to be even smaller in the futur
so
 
Chart 4 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Thus a large rate of decline of real residential investment reduces the overall growth rate by 
about one percentage point.  This is roughly the average effect that has been estimated by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the nine quarters since the beginning of 2006 (0.91 percent).  
In the absence of any acceleration in the pace of decline in housing starts, it is unlikely that the 
direct effect on GDP growth would increase in the future.  It is also important to bear in mind 
that such a direct effect on the growth rate of GDP ignores the ability of the resources that would 
have generated residential investment to move fairly quickly into other economic activity, for 
example, commercial construction, so that the direct effect overstates the potential effect on 
demand for real goods and services and real GDP.  
 
The pace of the house price increase also slowed after 2005.  During 2005, house prices rose at a 
peak 9.5 percent rate faster than consumer prices, using the house price index measured by 
OFHEO. Since then, the pace of relative price increase has slowed to negative territory. Further 
slowing cannot be ruled out; it is possible that the relative price will decline and many analysts 
have suggested that the actual house price index could fall.  The Standard & Poors’ Case-Shiller 
house price index for 20 cities (prone to having the largest cyclical swings in house prices) 
shows declines since January 2007 that have risen in magnitude to 14.4 percent for the year 
ending in March 2008, the latest data available, but this is not reflected in the broader national 
measures. Some of these cities actually had price bubbles in the recent years, though this was not 
the case on a national basis using the OFHEO or other measures. The key conclusion is that there 
is no recession that can be expected from the housing sector consequences of the foreclosure 
problem, though some analysts, based on an expected worsening of the problem or the credit 
market influences of foreclosures, point to substantial risk of recession. 
  
Some analysts focus on the indirect effect of the influence of the foreclosure crisis on consumer 
spending instead of residential construction. The value of residential housing assets in the United 
States is about $20 trillion (fourth quarter 2007), about 28 percent of total household assets.  
Some fear that the foreclosure crisis will lead to a sharp reduction in household wealth and lead 
consumers to attempt to boost saving and cut spending in order to rebuild wealth. See Mishkin 
(2007) for example.  Others question whether there is likely to be such a sharp reduction and, 
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should it occur, that it will be sufficiently powerful to affect consumer spending appreciably (see 
Juster, Lupton, Smith and Stafford 2006, for example).  
 
Another indirect effect of the foreclosure crisis, some argue, is the effect that it has had on policy 
makers’ actions to lower the federal funds rate and thereby lower the value of the dollar and 
overall demand via this linkage. There is no question that the dollar has been generally falling 
since the end of 2000, including since the federal funds rate was reduced after August 2007.  The 
correlation for the Fed’s broad trade-weighted exchange rate and the effective federal funds rate 
for weekly data from the week ending December 27, 2000 through July 2 2008 is -0.40, 
reflecting the downward trends in both measures. But the federal funds rate did rise from June 
23, 2004  and maintain relatively high levels until August 2007, yet the dollar fell over this 
period too, though more slowly that it did from the end of 2000 or subsequently.  But the dollar 
actually fell much more slowly in the early period, end-2000 to end-June 2004, when it fell at a -
1.55 percent annual rate while the federal funds rate was reduced from 6.5 percent to 1 percent, 
than it did in the more recent period.  From the week ending August 8, 2007 through the week 
ending July 2, 2008, the dollar fell at a 7.55 percent rate, almost seven times as fast, while the 
federal funds rate only fell about half as much, from 5.25 percent to 2.08 percent . While short 
term interest rates may have a positive relationship to the dollar, this effect is typically reversed 
when the interest rate movements are tied to inflationary expectations and there are other more 
important factors that affect the value of the dollar, such as the outlook for tax rates in the United 
States and more generally the outlook for the economic growth differential.   
  
II. The financial effects of the foreclosure problem  
The other direct effect of the foreclosure problem is financial.  Every mortgage that is foreclosed 
results in someone losing their house and having to bear transitional housing costs and the loss of 
what is for them sometimes a large amount of equity they had in a house. The greater costs of 
losing a home through foreclosure are the so-called “psychic costs” in embarrassment, self-
confidence and self-esteem for parents and children, as well as the damage of a deflated credit 
rating on the ability to find work, to secure a new residence, including a rented one, to acquire 
insurance, to get credit or to secure any good or service that carries future responsibilities for 
payment. The biggest financial losses, however, usually accrue to the mortgage lenders and those 
who have financed them. 
  
In early 2007, mortgage lenders, particularly “mono-line” lenders, who only do mortgage 
lending, began to fail in large numbers, either because they held relatively large asset positions in 
subprime loans that were moving into delinquency or losing value because of expectations that 
they would, or because of the decline in the lending business. Over 70 mortgage companies went 
into bankruptcy or out of business in the first quarter of 2007. American Century was the first of 
the major mono-line mortgage lenders to exit the industry. Other large mortgage lenders that 
have failed or are in bankruptcy include American Home Mortgage and First American 
Mortgage.  Many large financial providers exited the subprime business, including H&R Block, 
Nomura Securities, Lehman Brothers and Countrywide Mortgage. The near failure of 
Countrywide led to their merger agreement with Bank of America, but it remains to be seen 
whether this transaction will occur.   
  
Beginning in the spring and summer of 2007, hedge funds, large and small, went out of business 
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because of losses on collateralized debt packages that they held and that were based on payments 
on subprime loans.  Best known are the near half-billion dollar losses at UBS’ hedge fund Dillon 
Read, due to about $150 million in direct losses and related liquidation costs, and the $2 billion 
in losses at two Bear Stearns funds that threatened the viability of the firm. Sowood Capital lost 
$1.5 billion, half its fund, before being sold to Citaldel Investment Group.  Major investment 
banks, including Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS, lost 15 to 30 percent of their market 
capitalization in July and August, and much more later.  Dozens of hedge funds closed in the 
same months because of large subprime related losses and a lack of liquidity. 
  
The U.S. subprime crisis spread to other countries. U.K.-based Calibur Capital lost 82 percent of 
its $900 million hedge fund because of subprime related losses and will be closed.  Basis Capital 
in Australia announced that one of its funds, part of a $1 billion group, could lose half its value, 
due to subprime and structured credit tied to subprime loans, while others including Absolute 
Capital in Australia and BNP Paris announced suspensions of redemptions and withdrawals 
because of subprime losses. 
  
The worst phase of the process, at least from the perspective of financial market losses, came 
during the week of August 9, 2007 when two state-owned German banks were bailed out. It was 
these potential failures that led credit markets to seize up and to the massive intervention, over 
$130 billion, by the European Central Bank. The Federal Reserve responded in kind, though not 
in scale, by injecting funds into the credit market, lowering the discount rate, and forming a 
consortium of major banks to borrow at the discount window to show that it is all right to borrow 
from the Fed to further its attempt to prop up the most hard hit markets for short-term financial 
and commercial credit. The latter effort was largely unsuccessful and later led to more aggressive 
steps to introduce new policies that would boost bank borrowing.  The loan volume in the asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) market declined about 6 percent or $90 billion in the week 
ending August 23, 2007 because this paper was partially backed by an unknown but small 
proportion of subprime mortgages.  Eventually the decline was about $400 billion as ABCP fell 
from about $1.2 billion to about $800 billion.  
  
The asset-backed commercial paper market shrank in August 2007 because of the realization that 
most of the pools of assets that backed this commercial paper contained varying shares of 
subprime mortgages of varying risk of default and foreclosure. Hedge funds following this model 
and other firms dependent on the commercial paper market, especially bank holding companies, 
have reduced the supply of these assets by more than the decline in demand, so that interest rates 
on these instruments actually fell throughout August and September.  The shrinkage in the 
commercial paper market resulted in other credit products being dumped on markets besides 
subprime loans.  More and more funds are surfacing that have financed long-term and illiquid 
structured asset holdings with short-term asset-backed commercial paper.  Many of these firms 
have prime brokerage arrangements, which provide servicing of financial transactions, and 
credit, with major investment banks so that the spillover effects fall on major banks, jeopardizing 
bank capital. Most analysts expected the subprime problem to be contained among specialized 
mortgage lenders and hedge funds, and, more importantly, for there to be little effect on banks or 
other systemic effects on the banking system. 
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The spread of the subprime loan problem to institutions that had heavy exposure to such loans 
quickly was augmented by institutions that financed themselves by issuing asset-backed 
commercial paper.  Even if they remained solvent after their losses on the subprime related-
assets, their ability to refinance their short-term debt positions became impossible. The only 
recourse was to obtain alternative financing or begin to liquidate assets whose value had 
certainly fallen but was unclear and too risky in a cautious market. Not surprisingly, analysts 
began to talk about credit markets that were seizing up, or even a credit crunch. These 
developments mushroomed when it became clear that banks, the one group of institutions that 
investors thought relatively more immune, began to exhibit similar problems. 
  
In part, the expectation that major financial firms and banks would be insulated from the effects 
of the foreclosure problem was based on the well-capitalized position of the U.S. banks.  Cracks 
in this story widened following bailouts and the failure of Sachsen LB in Germany. The crisis 
spread to Northern Rock, the fifth largest mortgage lender in the United Kingdom, which 
suffered the first run on a British bank since the Overend, Gurney and Co. run in 1866. Northern 
Rock had also come to rely on non-deposit commercial paper financing and when that dried up 
there was a run on the small amount of deposits it had relative to its assets.  Eventually the Bank 
of England bailed out Northern Rock with loans of over $100 billion.  The most significant 
initial failure in the United States was that of NetBank, a $2.5 billion internet bank based in 
Georgia, that had taken on a portfolio of subprime mortgages and whose lending activity had 
resulted in losses of $200 million in 2006 alone.  NetBank, which failed in late September 2007,   
was the largest U.S. bank to fail in 2007 and the second of three failures in 2007.  
  
Countrywide, the largest mortgage firm and mainly a prime mortgage lender, was the first to 
suggest that subprime problems were migrating to prime loans, especially home equity credit 
lines, when they announced a sharp reduction in second quarter earnings on July 24, 2007.  
Subsequently speculation over the trouble at Countrywide led to large stock price declines and a 
liquidity problem that forced them to take up all of an $11 billion credit line and to sell $2 billion 
in convertible preferred stock to Bank of America. Countrywide announced the elimination of its 
Full Spectrum subsidiary, its subprime and alt-A lending arm, and its wholesale division, which 
arranged loans through brokers, on August 20, 2007.  It later announced the layoff of about 20 
percent of its 60,000 workers.  By late September, along with other indicators of a temporary 
return to normality, Countrywide announced that its deposits had begun to rise in response to its 
offer of above-market interest rates.  By May 2008, there were widespread doubts that their 
merger would be completed and that the bank would survive.   
  
On the financial market side of the foreclosure crisis, employment fell sharply.  In the first seven 
months of 2007, 39,200 jobs in credit intermediation and related activities, mainly banking, were 
lost.  In the nine months from July 2007 to April 2008, another 81,200 were lost in this sector. In 
the broader finance and insurance sector, 126,000 jobs have been lost since the end of 2006, 
111,000 since July 2007. In just the 10 days from August 13 to August 23, 2007, the Wall Street 
Journal found about 12,000 announced job losses at mortgage companies in the subprime and 
alt-A loan areas. 
  
By October 2007, many signals suggested that the pressures on global financial markets were 
easing.  Pressures on the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity through its discount window had 
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eased and primary credit through this facility had declined to an average of $88 million in the 
week ending September 26, 2007 after peaking at $2.9 billion during the week ending September 
12, 2007.  Before the credit crisis and bank failures in Europe around August 9, 2007 such credit 
had been nearly zero. Other signs of easing include the fact that prime 30-year fixed rate 
mortgages have had lower interest rates since August 9 and government securities, especially 
short-term securities, had lower yields following August 9, than they had at the beginning of the 
crisis.  The flight to quality that lowered the three-month Treasury bill rate from 4.77 percent on 
average for the week ending August 3, 2007 to a low of 3.62 percent two weeks later, rose back 
to 3.93 the week before the Fed cut its federal funds rate target by 50 basis points to 4.75 percent.  
Treasury yields with maturities from 2 - 10 years continued to fall until the Fed action and then 
began to rise, though they remained well below pre-crisis levels.  Treasury yields subsequently 
resumed their decline, falling especially sharply in March 2008 and afterwards.  
   
Credit markets were said to have seized up in three key episodes in August-September 2007, in 
December 2007-January 2008 and March 2008, with after effects of the latest events continuing 
into June 2008. The market for subprime mortgages has been largely moribund, as is the market 
for securitized debt based on asset pools containing them. While asset-backed commercial paper 
volume outstanding fell nearly 1.2 trillion in early August 2007 to 0.8 trillion from December 
2007 to April 2008, and declined further in May, it was replaced by a large increase in the 
volume of commercial bank and institutional money market lending. To finance the SIVs and 
other assets that had been financed by asset-backed commercial paper, banks have increased 
issuance of certificates of deposit, and institutional money funds have expanded, as higher rates 
than earlier attracted the funds that formerly were invested in asset-backed commercial paper. 
Jumbo mortgages, those for more than $417,000 that cannot be bought and securitized or held by 
the government-sponsored credit institutions Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac, faced a more limited 
private market and their rates have risen to exceed conforming loan rates by a full percentage 
point or more, making these loans more expensive for borrowers than they were before August 9, 
2007. Congress temporarily raised the ceiling on jumbo mortgages to $729,750 in the economic 
stimulus bill (through the end of 2008), but since taking effect in April, but this increase has not 
fully relieved the problems in this market, at least initially. The spread between conforming and 
these non-conforming loans spiked to about a full percentage point, more than twice the previous 
leak level of about 50 basis points seen in previous periods of stressed credit markets, and this 
spread has remained the same or higher in April and May, 2008.  
  
In December 2007 and January 2008, another round of liquidity problems surfaced as end-of-
year liquidity demand of financial institutions led to a spike in borrowings from central banks, 
and new facilities for longer term borrowing reaching 90 days in the United Kingdom. For 
example, bank borrowing from the Fed averaged $3 billion in the week ending December 13, 
2007, rivaling the temporary peak in September 2007. One of the ironies of the situation is 
continued talk of “frozen” or “seized up” market and a credit crisis.  Among financial experts, 
financial market thinking is dominated by concepts of rational agents participating on forward-
looking, self-correcting markets. In this case, markets cannot seize up or fail.  Prices adjust 
rapidly to restore market balance.  Yet SIVs (shades of Enron), and other issuers of asset-backed 
securities, are said to face frozen markets.  Historically, this is a claim made in employment 
markets and other non-financial markets that refer to situations where market participants refuse 
to trade at existing prices.  Nothing is frozen except their unwillingness to trade and that thaws as 
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soon as it is clear that there are no better opportunities, such as being bailed out or allowed to 
hold failed assets on your books without taking losses. The Treasury’s early efforts to create a 
consortium to hold these assets at unchanged or little changed prices failed, so banks are began 
to take these assets back on their books and financed them internally. Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae, along with banks, launched efforts to avoid taking losses on loan guarantees, the next stage 
of the crisis, but are not likely to escape realizing losses large losses.  
 
Major international banks continue to register losses. Led by UBS’ $42 billion in write offs, 
seven large European banks wrote off $108.5 billion from the beginning of 2007 through the first 
quarter of 2008. Over the same period, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
reports that U.S. insured institutions wrote off $105.6 billion.6 In addition, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac wrote off $8.9 billion and AIG wrote off $20 billion over the same period.  The 
global financial sector has survived the credit crisis that began on August 9, 2007 quite well 
despite periodic bouts of illiquidity that have rotated through selected markets. It does appear 
that the credit markets and banks are much more resilient and stronger than had been believed in 
mid-August 2007, and can adjust quickly and relatively painlessly to a breakdown in confidence 
or trust in various credit instruments. The CEOs of many large banks have lost their jobs, 
including those of UBS, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia, and 
insolvencies and more job losses are expected to continue for some time. 
 
In March 2008, the near failure of Bear Stearns and the launch of several new Fed policies 
discussed below intensified market concerns over the viability of bond insurers, especially those 
who had begun to invest in the securities that they insured, were expected to have deteriorating 
credit rating that would, in turn, threaten their solvency.  This had contagion effects to mortgage 
backed securities and other securities with low credit ratings and significant listed default 
insurance securities.  Other novel and risky assets also came into question, especially the auction 
rate security market.  Since the latter market was an important source of financing of student 
loans, and their economic viability had been brought into question by congressional legislation 
earlier in the year, this market also froze up and few traders could be found for what would 
normally have been routine auctions. The consequences of these changes has had lasting effects 
on the extent of emergency borrowing from the Fed, while creating uncertainty on the extent of 
new safety nets for financial firms, GSEs and any other firms that might be at risk in financial 
markets. Congressional discussion of extending Fed lending to mortgage borrowers at risk for 
foreclosure or for student loans quickly surfaced after the Bear Stearns loan and merger 
arrangements in March 2008 (discussed below).  These reactions showed the slippery slope of 
using central bank powers to pursue public ends for private outcomes that go well beyond the 
mandate of the Fed. They also reinforced the growing perception of the politicization of the Fed.  
 
The cost of the foreclosure crisis is very large 
A four percent foreclosure rate would imply about $400 billion in foreclosed loans. With a loss 
rate of 50 percent, this would imply overall mortgage loan losses to bank lenders equal to about 
$200 billion.  Of course there is a small fraction of additional loss to the home owners who lose 
their equity, if any, in the homes.  To the extent that high levels of foreclosed property in real 
estate markets reduce housing prices, the losses to other home owners will also be significant.  
 
                                                          
6 See the Lex column (2008) and FDIC (2008).  
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The losses to U.S. banks and other depository institutions will absorb about half the mortgage 
losses because the rest of these mortgages have been securitized and sold off to other investors, 
including to banks abroad.  This means losses to U.S. banks would be about $100 billion. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2008) recently estimated 
much smaller losses to U.S. commercial banks, about $60 billion, but the overall cost of the 
crisis is estimated to be about $350 to $450 billion.  The OECD has pointed out that banks hold 
about $9 in deposits per dollar of capital so that a $60 billion loss of capital would lead to a 
decline in bank credit by $548 billion, a decline of about 5.4 percent in total bank assets.  Such a 
shrinkage implies a large decline in bank credit, or the “credit crunch” that is now widely 
believed to be in process. The OECD estimates that it could take six months to two years to 
replace the lost capital out of earnings and that this would imply a completely unacceptable 
credit crunch and recession that “CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.” Of course if the loss 
in bank capital is over twice as large, then so will be the overall decline in credit.   
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2008) produced a much larger estimate of losses.  In their 
view, the total loss due to the foreclosure crisis is likely to be $945 billion. However, this 
shocking figure includes much more than the estimates above.  It factors in other security losses 
that are associated with the credit crunch.  In particular, it includes a $565 billion loss on 
mortgages, still much larger than those above because of its inclusion of price-induced increases 
in mortgage delinquencies.   
 
Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) (GHKS) estimate that the total losses will be $400 
billion, with about half being borne by U.S. financial institutions.  These are about the same as 
the estimates here.  They take this loss as a basis for further effects on credit supply and GDP 
arising through a financial accelerator linking bank capital to the supply of non-financial sector 
credit.7 The $200 billion loss in capital to banks, savings and loans, credit unions, brokers, hedge 
funds and GSEs is expected to result in a decline in non-financial domestic credit available by 
about $910 billion reduction in credit available to non-financial firms.  They estimate that a 1 
percent drop in the supply of nonfinancial debt would lead to a 0.34 percent drop in GDP growth 
in the short run and a 0.44 percent loss in GDP in the long run.   For the $910 billion, or 3 
percent, drop in credit available, this yields a 1.3 percent drop in real GDP growth over a year, 
about $420 billion per year in a $14 trillion economy. They view this effect as additive to any 
decline coming from that in residential investment and from any wealth effects on consumer 
spending.  The GHKS estimates are much larger than the IMF’s or OECD’s despite the fact that 
they start with a larger $200 billion loss for financial institutions (the same as the estimate in this 
paper) compared with the OECD’s $60 billion, but smaller than the IMF’s total loss of about 
$565 billion, or $282.5 billion for financial institutions on a comparable basis. The reason is that 
they make some critical assumptions that blow the impacts up by a huge amount.     
 
There are many assumptions, as would be expected, in the GHKS analysis. The most important 
for the purposes here are that they assume that financial institutions will raise only half as much 
new equity as they lose from the subprime crisis and, more importantly, that the decline in 
capital will be multiplied by a nearly unchanged ratio of desired assets to equity of 10, roughly 
the ratio for banks and for all the financial firms listed above. The OECD and IMF also include a 
“deleveraging effect” as banks reduce overall credit supplies in line with the reduction in bank 
                                                          
7 The financial accelerator and its effects are explained by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).  
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capital.  The IMF total reduction in bank assets is similar to that in GHKS and much larger than 
the OECD estimate. Both assume larger deleveraging effects than GHKS, but, as noted earlier, a 
substantially higher percentage of new capital has been raised to offset provisions of banks due 
to losses on subprime loans.  However, a recent estimate by Sarkozy and Quarles (2008) puts 
new capital raised already at $330 billion on $350 billion of losses, or about 94 percent 
replacement.  This is not to mention offsets through newly profitable asset allocation changes 
that are likely to absorb all of the potential reductions in bank loans arising from the financial 
accelerator.    
 
Finally, the GHKS estimate that GDP is driven by growth in nonfinancial domestic debt is 
shaky.  Evidence that bank credit is constrained by bank capital loss is weak, as is the view that 
real domestic credit growth determines real GDP.  There is growing literature that bank credit 
affects GDP; see especially Stein (2003) or, for one of the principal sources of evidence on this 
approach, Kashyap and Stein (1994).  But the link between capital losses and bank credit growth 
is not strong, especially in the recent case where large institutions suffering the greatest losses 
due to the subprime crisis have raised about as much capital as they lost.  In addition, the 
literature on the credit channel usually stresses the unique role of banks, not nonfinancial 
domestic debt, and GHKS do not cite any literature that shows a link between bank credit and 
nonfinancial domestic debt. Nonetheless whether monetary policy slowed GDP, or bank capital 
losses have caused such a slowing, or both, a slowing in GDP growth began in mid-2006 and has 
continued into 2008.     
 
Viewed in light of the OECD and IMF estimates, the estimate here of $200 billion (the same as 
the starting point in GHKS) represents a middle ground.  The credit market implications of losses 
of this size and the timing of those implications may also be much different from the IMF, 
OECD or GHKS estimates.  In particular, these estimates treat the effects as if they will only 
occur in the near future, almost seeming to exclude the losses that have already been registered 
and also excluding consideration of the capital already raised by financial institutions. In fact, 
substantial losses have already been realized. The FDIC reports that U.S.-insured financial 
institutions reported asset write-downs of $105.6 billion from the beginning of 2007 through the 
first quarter of 2008. Recent estimates of the largest asset write-downs since January 2007 total 
about $190 billion (Lex 2008). In addition, Fannie and Freddie have reported write-downs of 
$8.9 billion over the same period. These figured are far above the IMF estimate. Moreover, 
banks have been very aggressive in raising new capital, offsetting the lion’s share of write-downs 
already. Bank capital overall is relatively high and healthy and expected to stay that way in 2008.  
Moreover, bank profits are generally sufficient to absorb some capital reduction while offsetting 
much of the reduction out of other profits within a short period. 
 
The larger losses expected by the IMF, OECD and GHKS rest upon a financial accelerator or 
deleveraging effect that multiplies a capital loss into a much large reduction in bank credit.  
Ignoring the already noted likelihood that banks have or will easily replace any capital that they 
think it is optimal to have, it is not obvious that highly capitalized banks will be constrained in 
their loan growth by their capital. Banks can readily reduce their investment portfolio to boost 
loans, without any change in capital. Annual asset growth for insured commercial banks from 
1968 to 2006 is uncorrelated with the previous year-end ratio of capital to total assets for asset 
measures including gross loans (0.02) and commercial loans (-0.04); the correlation with total 
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asset growth is positively significant (0.80). While the growth rate of bank size is correlated with 
the starting equity ratio, loan growth, including commercial loan growth is not.8 
 
Increased bank failures are also likely to rise.  While there have been few bank failures in the 
United States in recent years, the incidence is expected to rise. In 2007 there were three bank 
failures, up from zero in the previous two years. There have been three failures in 2008 by mid-
May.  The number of problem institutions rose to 72 in 2007, the highest level since 2004, but 
lower than the numbers from 1990-2004.  However, the analysis here does suggest that credit 
growth is likely to be unimpaired unless the Fed restricts bank asset growth further.  The 
foreclosure problem will continue to worsen over the next 9 months, according to most 
estimates, as resets of the mortgage rate on adjustable rate loans approaches their peak.  The 
banking system is well along in absorbing the write-downs, but further losses are likely to be 
written off and more capital will have to be raised.  Banks are far ahead of the curve, however, in 
adjusting to the problem.  The recession outlook is worsened and lengthened by foreclosure and 
credit problems, but those two factors alone do not account for the current dismal outlook 
  
What credit crunch?  
The notion of a credit crisis is equally problematical. The simplest evidence of a credit crunch is 
that the scarcity of credit would drive up the price of credit. But with few exceptions, risk-
adjusted interest rates have fallen since early August 2007; moreover they fell before the Fed 
began to lower the federal funds rate target and they continued to fall, and by more than the Fed 
cuts, at least until recently, when inflation and policy risk scares began to push rates higher, at 
least temporarily. Most interest rates are far below levels of early August 2007 (see Chart 3 
above, for example).   The key instruments that have exhibited higher levels are jumbo mortgage 
rates, where there has been some uncertainty about their marketability, and bank CD rates where 
the switch in funding from SIVs through asset-backed commercial paper has switched to bank 
financing along with funds from institution money market funds. Another market where there is 
upward pressure is the London interbank offering rate, a rate for loans between banks in London.  
Due to the discovery of an absence of an efficient and quick resolution method for bank 
insolvencies in Britain, interbank loans there have taken on unusual risk.  But even dollar-
denominated loan rates there are lower than they were in August 2007.   Bank lending and 
money market institutions have expanded much more than the decline in asset-backed 
commercial paper since early August 2007. 
  
Besides a generally declining cost of credit, it is also the case that bank lending accelerated in the 
first eight months of the financial crisis, at least according to weekly and monthly seasonally 
adjusted data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (see Chart 5). 
 
Chart 5 
Bank credit growth did not slow from August 2007, but has since March 2008 
                                                          
8 The data are from the FDIC’s “Historical Statistics on Banking.” A replication of the GHKS analysis of real GDP 
growth from 1983 to the present found that neither lagged growth of loans and leases (t = -0.54) nor commercial and 
industrial loan growth (t = -0.11) were significant, nor were their counterpart measures for growth over the previous 
four quarters, where t-statistics are 0.61 and 0.06, respectively.  
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
From the week ending August 1, 2007 just before the crisis became apparent, to December 5, 
2007, bank credit at all institutions grew $458.3 billion, or at a 16.9 percent annual rate.  This 18-
week advance is much faster than the 8.5 percent rate over the previous 36 weeks, an increase of 
$243.2 billion. Over the next 18 weeks to March 19, 2008, bank credit grew at a 14.3 percent 
rate, still much faster than before the financial crisis.  It is the case that bank credit growth 
declined since mid-March 2008, but this is ironically precisely the date when multiple new Fed 
programs began to channel more credit to the financial sector (discussed below).   Money funds 
have also grown rapidly, making far more short-term credit available. Institutional money funds 
surged up $304.5 billion from July to November 2007, a 71.9 percent annual rate, up from a 
$200 billion rise or 23.5 percent rate in the previous eight months. Since November 2007, the 
increase continued at a rapid pace, rising $347.5 billion over the five months to April 2008, a 
51.4 percent rate. These two major sources of short-term credit have seen explosive growth since 
the supposed credit crunch began.  It is important to bear in mind, however, that while total 
credit was expanding rapidly, there are areas where borrowers are reluctant or refuse to pay the 
premiums they would have to pay to continue to secure the short-term credit they had during the 
summer of 2007.  This is especially the case with SIVs and others dependent on asset-backed 
commercial paper. 
 
Other indicators of rapid credit growth exist for sectors close to more complex credit 
instruments.  Trainor (2008) reports that the Commercial Finance Association’s quarterly index 
of asset-based lending grew at a 5.6 percent rate in the first quarter of 2008 and that total 
committed credit lines rose 4.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007.  Three-quarters of reporting 
lenders indicated rising loan commitments.  Exchange-based derivatives trading, specifically 
futures and options trading, also expanded sharply in 2007.  Burkhardt (2008) indicates that over 
15 billion contracts on 54 exchanges experienced trading volume growth of 28 percent in 2007, 
sharply higher than the 19 percent increase in 2006, 12 percent rise in 2005, or 9 percent growth 
in 2004.  U.S. volume on the CME/CBOT kept pace with the world total, rising 27 percent.   
 
 
II. The Federal Reserve in Crisis 
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Since August 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has approached near 
panic in their adoption of multiple and inconsistent traditional policy measures and, since 
December 2007, they have multiplied these efforts by adopting major new policy tools, some of 
which may go well beyond their congressional mandate.9  These actions have been motivated, in 
the first instance by an emerging mortgage foreclosure crisis that began in late 2006 and that the 
Fed first recognized in May 2007, and in the second instance by a credit crisis that emerged in 
August 2007 in Europe and quickly moved on shore.  This article summarizes and explains the 
Fed actions since August 2007.10   
 
 
 
Normal policy actions 
The Fed conducts monetary policy primarily through setting a federal funds rate target and a 
primary credit rate (formerly called the discount rate).  The federal funds rate is the rate at which 
depository institutions (banks) borrow or lend funds held in their deposit accounts at the Fed. 
This rate is agreed between borrower and lender institutions on individual loan transactions, 
generally overnight.  The Fed attempts to intervene in Treasury security market through open 
market operations, which are the purchase or sale of Treasury securities with primary security 
dealers, in order to change the amount of depository institutions’ deposits at the Fed.  The Fed 
does this in order to influence the federal funds rate and to keep the monthly average of daily 
average rates at its target rate. The primary credit rate is the rate at which qualifying depository 
institutions can borrow from the Fed directly, again generally overnight. Borrowing from the Fed 
is not common or frequent for banks.  There have been many serious or even “appalling” errors, 
in the response of the Fed to the credit market and non-bank problems created by the foreclosure 
crisis.11  Only a few central ones are examined here, looking at actions distinguished by normal 
policy actions and new ones. 
 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that one of the most important steps taken by 
the Fed in this century was reversed at the outset. Discount policy had been the subject of a long 
debate over the history of the Fed on the appropriate use of discount lending as a tool of 
monetary policy.  Anna Schwartz (1992) recounted many of these issues in her classic work on 
the discount window, including problems it created for the conduct of monetary policy, the 
abuses of a “subsidy” discount rate where the rate at which the Fed loaned funds to banks was 
below the federal funds rate, the fact that the Fed often loaned funds for liquidity purposes to 
                                                          
9 See Chapman (2008) and Reinhart (2008b) for some similar arguments, especially on the expansion of private 
sector credit exposure arising from the Bear Stearns debacle and merger.  
10 The policy switches and indecision exhibited by the Fed could have been influenced by the shortage and mix of 
governors of the Fed over the period.  Due to political differences between the Administration and Congress, there 
were two vacancies among the seven governors that could not be filled due to Congressional opposition.  A third 
opening became available at the end of January 2008, when one governor’s term expired.  He continued to serve 
pending his confirmation to a new term or the confirmation of his replacement, and a fourth open position becomes 
available at the end of August.  After that, there will be problems insuring the availability of a quorum for the 
conduct of Board business.  During this interval there is a strong case for extraordinary politicization of the Fed by 
Congressional pressures, but that goes beyond the scope of this paper.   
11 The “appalling” description has been attributed by Torres (2008) to William Poole who retired as president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at the end of March 2007, after most of the steps discussed in this section had 
been taken. The comment was in reference specifically to the loans and subsequent arrangements to facilitate the 
merger of Bear Stearns.  In the same article, Anna Schwartz is quoted as saying the loans were a “rogue operation.” 
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insolvent banks and finally the pressures on the Fed to lend to non-banks. She advocated that the 
Fed abolish the discount window. For most purposes, liquidity can be provided to markets 
equally well through open market operations, so the discount window is completely unnecessary 
for the conduct of monetary policy.12 In 2003, the Fed finally addressed many of the problems 
explained by Schwartz, but with one major exception, they did not abolish the discount window. 
Instead they created a penalty discount rate with a fixed spread over the federal funds rate for 
primary lending and an even higher spread for banks that have a low CAMELS rating (4 or 5).13 
These steps fixed many of the problems noted by Schwartz and they put the setting of the 
discount rate, which became the primary credit rate, on autopilot, moving in lock step with the 
federal funds rate target setting of the Fed. The Fed’s reaction to the foreclosure crisis reduced 
some of these advantages.  
 
Below changes in the primary credit rate are discussed as “normal” policy actions, but it should 
be kept in mind that under the 2003 changes in policy they were not completely normal.  In 
particular, the Fed led off its response with a change in the spread between the primary credit 
rate and the federal funds rate and spreads were allowed to change subsequently, restoring the 
notion that the discount rate setting was an independent component of policy along with the 
setting of the federal funds target. This added complexity in the conduct of monetary policy and 
the necessity for market analysts and participants to anticipate not only federal funds rate target 
changes, but also changes in the primary discount rate, threw out one of the major advances in 
policy.  Also by focusing more on targeted lending to illiquid banks, the Fed recreated the 
potential for lending to failing banks and for pressures on itself to lend to non-banks.  Only now, 
much of that lending was via other new lending routes. Nonetheless, the changes in the primary 
credit rate are referred to as “normal” policy below.        
 
Table 2 shows the multiple, frequent and sometimes large changes in the federal funds target rate 
and discount rate since August 2007.  There are two large changes in the federal funds rate that 
equaled 75 basis points, one in January 2008 at an unscheduled meeting, followed up eight days 
later with another 50 basis point cut.  Either the situation was deteriorating faster than at any time 
in history, or the changes reflected some degree of hesitancy or indecision on the part of the Fed. 
Note that the lead-off action was a cut in the discount rate in August 2007.  This reflects the 
character of the problem.  Apparently, the Fed’s primary concern was to direct credit to financial 
institutions most in need of liquidity assistance instead of sending a generalized signal of easier 
credit as indicated by a federal funds rate cut. The narrowing of the spread between the federal 
funds rate and primary credit rate also reflects a decision to make credit easier for borrowing 
banks since the spread had been fixed by policy since 2003.   
  
Table 2 
“Normal” Policy Actions since January 2007 
                                                          
Federal 
funds 
Change 
(basis 
Primary 
credit 
Change 
(basis 
Effective 
date 
Spread 
(primary 
Scheduled 
meeting 
12 Schwartz (1992) cites Kaufman (1991) as support for this view of the lack of a proper role for the discount 
window and discount lending, but there are many others who have made this argument, including some cited by 
Kaufman.  This is a central proposition of central banking that has been stood on its head by the recent conduct of 
monetary policy, which has resurrected the notion that lending directly to illiquid, now insolvent, institutions works 
more quickly and with greater precision than open market operations.   
13 See Wheelock (2003) for an explanation of these changes.  
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 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) 
rate (%) points) rate (%) points) credit – 
fed funds) 
5.25% 25 6.25 25 6/29/06 100 Yes 
NA NA 5.75 -50 8/17/07 50 No 
4.75 -50 5.25 -50 9/8/07 50 Yes 
4.50 -25 5.00 -25 10/31/07 50 Yes 
4.25 -25 4.75 -25 12/11/07 50 Yes 
3.50 -75 4.00 -75 1/22/08 50 No 
3.00 -50 3.50 -50 1/30/08 50 Yes 
2.25 -75 2.50 -100 3/18/08 25 Yes 
2.00 -25 2.25 -25 4/30/08 25 Yes 
 
Another set of actions that constitute normal policy responses to international financial market 
disruptions are swaps loans of U.S. dollars for foreign currencies. Pressures in credit markets 
abroad led the Fed, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank to agree to bilateral 
swap arrangements of $20 billion and $4 billion, respectively, on December 7, 2007, and to 
extend and increase them to $30 billion and $6 billion on March 11, 2008. These actions were 
generally perceived to have reduced the liquidity shortfall of dollars in Europe and London and 
to bring down the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR), which had spiked up relative to 
the federal funds rate.      
 
New policy actions 
Throughout the credit crunch, the Fed has exhibited a profound concern for directing credit to the 
financial sector where the evidence of the credit crunch was believed to be greatest.  This 
approach stands in marked contrast to the traditional approach of supplying liquidity in a 
liquidity crisis and letting the market place direct credit to firms that truly face a liquidity crisis, 
instead of a solvency problem.  It also reverses the repair of the Fed’s lender-of-last resort 
function in 2003, which finally put this function on autopilot at a fixed penalty rate with a higher 
penalty for less credit worthy banks.  In August and September 2007 and again in December 
2007, there were large surges in borrowing from the Fed through discount lending to banks. 
Financial market conditions apparently deteriorated again in March 2008.  As a result, the Fed 
created a credit program in December 2007 and took several new steps in March 2008. Chart 6 
shows the unusual surges in borrowing.  After March 12, 2008, the data explode and remain 
quite high subsequently, despite the multiple new programs aimed at providing liquidity to banks 
and primary dealers.        
 
Chart 6 
Fed borrowings show the periods of credit stress 
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Financial Data, May 23, 2008. 
 
Aglietta and Scialom (2008) describe all of the Fed’s new actions as an illustration of the 
“permanence” of the central bank’s lender-of-last-resort function in the United States Euro-area, 
and the United Kingdom, in sharp contrast to the  analysis of the historical role of that function 
detailed above, its complication of Fed policy making, its inefficient transfers of taxpayer funds 
to banks and its essential dispensability in the face of simpler, quicker, less bank-dependent open 
market operations. They also ignore the significant revisions in the Fed’s discount policy adopted 
in 2003. In Aglietta and Scialom’s view,  the financial world has changed since the LTCM hedge 
fund crisis of 1998 so that the potential for hedge fund or other risky financial institutions to 
create financial market instability requires that the central banks take on supervisory oversight 
over these firms and put them under the umbrella of the lender-of-last-resort function. 
 
Their analysis is premised upon the assumption that financial stability has always been a central 
bank objective and that the objective has evolved over time. The emphasis on control of hedge 
funds derives from the notion that Bear Stearns failure was due to the failure of two of their 
hedge funds earlier. This is ironic because more than 70 hedge funds failed in the United States 
in the first half of 2007, and Amaranth failed in September 2007, all without systemic effects on 
other financial institutions. The Amaranth loss of 6.5 billion was nearly twice the size of the 
recapitalizations for LTCM or Bear Stearns hedge funds. Moreover, they ignore the failure of 
Enron in 2001, one of the largest derivative traders in the world at their peak, which did not 
cause a ripple in financial markets as underlying asset values in the energy sector and related 
financial derivatives collapsed. Bear Stearns failure was more similar to the failure of Drexel 
Burnham Lambert in 1990, which also had little or no systemic effects on other financial 
institutions.      
 
The striking feature of some of these new credits to banks, primary dealers and investment banks 
is that some of them allow financial institutions to borrow against so-called toxic waste, largely 
illiquid mortgage related assets.  The imminent failure of any institution because of its exposure 
to these assets will likely lead to a sharing of the losses by the Fed and taxpayers. In the best 
case, however, these new facilities allow banks to warehouse these assets, on which they are 
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reluctant to take losses, and gain liquidity by using the assets as collateral for government 
security borrowings from the Fed. This scheme allows financial institutions to forego necessary 
price adjustments on assets, extending the financial crisis and making it likely to be worse than it 
would have been without this assistance.   
 
The first new credit facility implemented by the Fed is the Term Auction Facility (TAF), 
announced on December 12, 2007.  This facility allows banks to acquire funds in regular 
auctions for 28 days with the same collateral as would be required for borrowing at the discount 
window.  The amount of funds auctioned is announced ahead of time and the market determines 
the auction rate at which transactions occur.  Initially auction amounts were $20 billion but have 
been raised to $50 billion.  The purpose of the TAF is to overcome the aversion of banks to 
borrow from the Fed through the discount window.  The rates at which banks have borrowed are 
near the target federal funds rate, allowing for expectations of declines over the next 28 days, an 
alternative borrowing rate for banks borrowing from another bank.     
 
The second new facility, announced on March 7 and expanded on March 11, 2008, is the Term 
Security Lending Facility (TSLF), which began on March 27, 2008.  This program arose in light 
of the liquidity and solvency problems at Bear Stearns, which teetered on insolvency on Friday, 
March 14, 2008, and the potential for contagion or illiquidity at other investment banks. Most 
large investment banks are also authorized as primary security dealers by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and are authorized to buy and sell U.S. securities with the Fed. At the outset 
of the financial crisis there were 20 primary dealers, but Bear disappeared on May 29, 2008 and 
Countrywide Securities will disappear soon due to its merger with Bank of America.  Bear 
Stearns agreed to merge with JPMorgan Chase, subject to their board’s approval, on March 16, 
2008, with the Fed’s approval. 
 
The TSLF will provide up to $200 billion in U.S. Treasury securities through a weekly auction of 
Treasury securities loans to primary dealers for a term of 28 days. The collateral asset is 
essentially a sort of swap, though not technically called one, with the Fed. It can include 
government agency debt, including residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS), or AAA/Aaa 
private label MBS (which some have referred to as the toxic waste of the financial system 
because they are relatively illiquid due to uncertainties of what each security contains), and 
commercial MBS.  The increased availability of Treasury securities at financial institutions is 
expected to improve liquidity in the repo market in particular, and to enhance liquidity at 
financial institutions.  There is already an overnight security lending facility (since December 
2006), but this new facility adds more certainty to availability of the securities and terms.  
 
A third program that grew out of the sale of Bear Stearns is the extension of credit to cover the 
potential loss on the least liquid and highest loss potential securities on the books of Bear 
Stearns. Initially these loans were to Bear Stearns and averaged about $5.5 billion for the week 
ending March 19, 2008 or $7.74 billion for the five days from March 14 through March 18, 
2008.  By March 19, 2008 these loans had been repaid. 
 
The commitment by the Fed to lend to Bear Stearns was later formalized in the creation of an 
SIV, though the Fed does not refer to it as such.  This is the arrangement that banks had used that 
led to the outbreak of the credit crunch and collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper 
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market that had financed bank SIVs in August, 2007. See Williams (2008) for more details. 
Under the Fed’s new SIV, the Fed loaned $29 billion and JPMorgan Chase lent $1 billion, with 
the SIV using the proceeds to acquire $30 billion of the most illiquid and dubious securities from 
Bear Stearns portfolio.  These securities were valued on a “mark-to-market” basis as of March 
14, 2008.  The SIV is managed by Black Rock Financial Management, Inc. The interest rate on 
the Fed’s loan will be the primary credit rate and the interest rate on JPMorgan Chase’s loan will 
be the primary credit rate plus 475 basis points.  Repayment is to begin no later than the second 
anniversary date of the loan. The Fed is the effective owner of the SIV because any profit or loss 
will accrue to the Fed after the first $1 billion loss, which will accrue to JPMorgan Chase.  The 
term of the loans is 10 years, but this term is renewable at the discretion of the Fed. The SIV first 
appeared on the Fed’s balance sheet on June 26 in data for the week ending July 2, 2008 under 
the prophetic name Maiden Lane LLC.  
 
Some analysts refer to this arrangement as a “bailout” of Bear Stearns.  This is a strange notion 
since Bear Stearns will cease to exist and the biggest losers will be the owners of Bear Stearns, 
30 percent of whom are employees.  It is understandable, however because of the lack of 
information on the structure of the loans and closure of Bear Stearns and also because at the 
outset, the Fed loaned funds to Bear Stearns for a few days. The initial loan from March 14, 2008 
was quickly repaid and the existing commitment is to create a Fed-owned SIV which will hold 
assets that have a mark-to-market value in excess of the Fed loan. Bear Stearns ceased to exist on 
May 30, 2008 under the arrangement, taken over by JPMorgan Chase at a fire sale price of $10 
per share. This means that the owners of Bear Stearns (again, 30 percent of whom were 
employees) lost nearly all of their equity in the firm, and many employees lost their jobs in the 
transition of ownership to JPMorgan Chase. If there was a bailout, it was for JPMorgan Chase 
and they are likely to have profited handsomely on the transaction. The biggest losers are the 
owners of Bear Stearns.  One implication of the Fed loan, however, is that it creates the 
expectation that investment banks can be “too big to fail,” at least for the four that were larger 
than Bear Stearns. Another is that the willingness to lend to investment banks now has created 
questions in political and other circles as to whether investment banks should also be regulated 
by the Fed. Of course the logic here is tortured because Bear Stearns will go out of business as a 
condition of the loan, and regulating them would not have protected them from failing.  
Moreover, the arrangement with JPMorgan Chase is more like a forced merger such as can occur 
when a bank fails; that is more similar to the bank insurer’s function than the Fed’s concern.    
 
The fourth new facility created by the Fed is the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), 
announced on March 16 with initial transactions on March 17, 2008.  This facility allows for Fed 
lending to primary dealers for up to 6 months at the primary credit rate with the normal collateral 
required for discount lending to banks.  The creation of the new facilities PDCF and the TSLF 
were reportedly based on the Bear Stearns experience and the Fed’s inability to lend to 
investment banks.  Most large investment banks are primary dealers to whom the Fed can lend 
through repurchase arrangements (RPs), including term RPs, and also most have bank charters 
that allow them to borrow as banks at the discount window and through the TAF program.14      
 
                                                          
14 For example, Bear Stearns Companies Inc. owned Bear Stearns Bank and Trust of Princeton New Jersey, a bank 
with nearly one billion dollars in total assets. Its acquisition by J.P. Morgan Chase and Co. was approved on April 1, 
2008.   
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The Fed has largely neutralized their efforts  
New and traditional credit facilities have been relatively large but have not carried through fully 
to the bottom line, the Fed’s total assets.  The reason is that new loans have been “sterilized” by 
sales of other assets on the books of the Fed, especially their holding of U.S. government 
securities. This is somewhat like the way a traditional commercial bank would meet an 
emergency credit demand by a client: it might reduce credit availability to other customers 
because of its existing funding. But even today, a commercial bank would recognize that it could 
meet this new credit demand without disrupting its business by seeking new funding in the form 
of deposits in the marketplace. The key textbook distinction between a commercial bank and a 
central bank is that the latter is unconstrained by its liabilities or its funding.  A central bank can 
print money, so if there is a new credit demand that it wishes to meet, it can print money instead 
of selling or reducing other assets.  This was the great error of the Fed in the Great Depression; it 
did not expand its assets to produce more money and credit in the economy to stimulate 
spending. It made this mistake because it acted like a private commercial bank and not a central 
bank. Ironically, the Fed is doing this again, behaving even more like a commercial bank by 
aggressively expanding its credit to the private sector.    
 
Table 3 shows key elements of the assets of the Fed at the beginning of the crisis and nine 
months later on April 30, 2008.  The data come from the Fed’s weekly H.4.1 release for August 
2, 2007, the week before the credit crisis component of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, and May 
1, 2008.  Note first that Treasury securities held outright have declined dramatically since August 
2007. Securities normally account for over 90 percent of Fed assets, but have declined 30.6 
percent in the past eight months, an amount equal to 27.2 percent of total assets of the Fed at the 
end of April. This is a dramatic and unprecedented shrinkage, all the more so at a time when the 
Fed is expected and claiming to be increasing liquidity and credit in the financial system.  
Overall total assets rose only $14.9 billion over the period, or about 1.7 percent.  Over the 
previous year, total assets grew 2.4 percent and this was down from a 4 percent increase from 
August 3, 2005 to August 2, 2006. Thus the Fed, despite their rhetoric, has done little or nothing 
to raise the total supply of credit, liquidity or money in the economy.  Such offsetting of asset 
acquisitions by sales of other assets is usually restricted to foreign exchange transactions and is 
referred to as “sterilization;” in effect, the Fed is sterilizing its credit extensions to financial 
institutions by liquidating its holding of Treasury securities.  The negligible growth of Fed assets 
reflects a slowing that has been going on for at least three years.    
 
Table 3 
The Fed has offset most of the new credit by selling securities 
Federal Reserve Balance Sheet (millions of dollars)  
Selected Assets 
(average for week 
ending on date 
indicated) 
 
 
 
April 30, 2008 
 
 
 
August 1, 2007 
 
 
 
Change 
Securities held 
outright 
 
$548,692 
 
$790,758 
 
-$242,066 
Repurchase 
agreements 
 
 115,500 
 
    25,786 
 
     89,714 
Term auction facility    
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(TAF)   100,000 NA     100,000 
Primary credit      11,964                       2        11,962 
Primary dealer 
Credit facility 
(PDCF) 
 
 
  17,775 
 
 
NA 
 
 
    17,775 
Other credit 
extensions 
 
0 
 
NA 
 
  0 
Securities lent to 
dealers 
  -term (TSLF) 
 -overnight facility 
 
 
143,409 
   23,176 
 
 
NA 
  9,917 
 
 
143,409 
  13,259 
Total private credit 
-Incl. security loans 
245,239 
 411,824 
25,788 
35,705 
219,451 
376,119 
Total assets 
(end of period) 
 
889,040 
 
874,112 
 
14,928 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
The Fed has switched their credit from the U.S. government to banks and primary dealers, a 
slight majority of which are affiliated with banks or bank holding companies.  Expansion of 
traditional lending to depository institutions has been small, except during a few periods noted 
above, but new facilities such as the TAF and PDCF have swelled to more than 13 percent of 
Fed total assets, increasing $117.8 billion since August 1, 2007. An even larger increase in new 
credit to the private sector, specifically Treasury security loans to dealers of $156.7 billion, 
substantially boosted credit to private firms. These loans are outstanding at the discretion of the 
dealers and so are not available for use for monetary policy purposes even if they remain good 
loans.   
 
Another category shown in Table 3 is repurchase agreements. These are short-term acquisitions 
of Treasury securities from primary dealers under agreements to be sold back to the primary 
dealers at a fixed price. Normally these are overnight transactions, but sometimes they are term 
RPs that can run a few days or even a few weeks. RPs surged, increasing by $89.7 billion over 
the first nine months of the foreclosure crisis.  An RP is normally a way the Fed provides funds 
to support bank reserves temporarily.  They indirectly, at least, have an effect of easing the cost 
pressures on primary dealers by holding down their inventory cost of holding securities, in order 
to support their business with financial institutions as dealers in Treasury securities.  
 
In the current context, they represent another way the Fed is trying to channel credit to 
depository institutions and investment banks and away from the U.S. government and also to 
accommodate investment banks’ demand for high quality securities by, in effect, borrowing 
those securities overnight rather than buying outright from them. In effect, the investment banks 
gain flexibility in their own Treasury security holdings, which is critical to their liquidity and 
funding requirements.  RPs have more than tripled, rising to almost 10 percent of the Fed’s 
assets.  If linked with other credit lines shown above in Table 3, credit to financial institutions 
has risen from about 3 percent of the Fed’s balance sheet at the beginning of the crisis to more 
than 27 percent of the balance sheet.   
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The third program above, the loan to an investment bank, has been zero except for the one week 
period in which a loan was outstanding.  This line on the Fed’s balance sheet is “other credit 
extensions.” The $29 billion loan to fund the acquisition of former Bear Stearns securities shows 
up in the Fed’s proprietary interest in their new on-balance sheet SIV called Maiden Lane LLC 
beginning June 26, 2008. Presumably, J.P. Morgan Chase owned the securities in the interim and 
sold them to Maiden Lane on that date.  
 
The other new facility, the TSLF, began on March 27, 2008 when $75 billion was auctioned in 
the first weekly auction.  Since there is an exchange of collateral securities under this program, 
there is no effect on overall Fed balance sheet assets, only the composition of their possession.   
 
When the security loans are taken into account, the private sector credit has risen from 4 percent 
of Fed assets in early August to 46.3 percent nine months later. The $29 billion payment to 
create the SIV holding private sector assets from Bear Stearns, assuming the practice continues 
of sterilizing these assets, will bring the total private sector credit share to 49.6 percent of Fed 
assets. Such a dramatic increase in exposure to the private sector and the extent of this exposure 
is unprecedented in Fed history and it has substantially impaired the size of assets that could be 
sold to fight inflation, cutting those assets in half. The hasty and risky decision to do so, and the 
potential defaults or losses on any of these positions, put the Fed’s reputation for prudential 
central banking and integrity directly at major risk. The contagion to the Fed’s credibility as an 
honest and responsible central bank is likely to be high in the event of any loss on private sector 
credit.  Even without losses, however, these innovative efforts have been completely 
unsuccessful in increasing the supply of credit to the U.S. economy. Private sector credit 
increases have been fully sterilized by the Fed, making little or no new credit available. 
 
Since Fed assets are volatile from week to week and the table is based on daily observations, it is 
useful to check the monthly average data on the Fed’s direct supply of credit. According to the 
Board of Governors’ monetary base measure, adjusted for reserve requirement changes, the base 
grew at only a 0.6 percent annual rate from July 2007 to April 2008, down from 2.1 percent in 
the previous year and 4.0 percent in the year earlier (July 2005 to July 2006). This perspective 
indicates that policy actions are continuing a slowing that began much earlier and that, since the 
financial crisis began, there has been no acceleration in Fed supply of credit, money and liquidity 
to the financial system. The comparable measure from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
shows essentially the same pattern of slowing to a stagnant pace, with a recent annual growth 
rate of 0.5 percent, and earlier rates of 2.0 and 3.5 percent rates, respectively. 
 
Monetary aggregate measures have not accelerated much since August 2007, except for a brief 
spurt in January-February 2008.  This should not be surprising since monetary base growth has 
slowed.  But flights to safety have boosted bank CDs and money market deposit account 
balances, especially early in 2008.  M2 growth accelerated slightly from a 4.8 percent rate in the 
year ending in July 2007 to a 5.4 percent annual rate from July to December 2007.  From 
December 2007 to February 2008, growth surged to a 13.1 percent rate and then fell over the 
next two months to a 7.7 percent rate.  All of this is due to investment in short-term financial 
assets included in M2 since M1 growth remained negligible over the period. In the year before 
the crisis, July 2006 to July 2007, M1 declined at a 0.2 percent rate. In the first five months of 
turmoil, M1 declined at a 0.3 percent rate.  There was a slight acceleration from December 2007 
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to February 2008, M1 grew at a 1.8 percent rate and then fell over the next two months at a 1.1 
percent rate. M1 has shown no growth for the full period July 2007 to April 2008, as was the 
case for the year preceding the credit market problem, so all of the growth in M2 has been in 
non-transactions account balances.  The story is identical if one adjusts M1 to include estimate 
sweep balances.  The slowing in monetary base growth over the past four three years and in M1 
or adjusted M1 and to a lesser extent in M2 are consistent with the subsequent slowing in GDP 
growth.   
 
IV. Prospects and Outlook  
There are numerous issues posed by the Fed’s policy actions since last August, especially the 
necessity and appropriateness of the new credit facilities and whether they, in turn, require that 
Congress provide new regulatory powers to the Fed.  The other concern going forward is how 
much longer the problem will grow and how severe the financial crisis will become.  Alan 
Greenspan recently answered this question in the Financial Times: 
 
The current financial crisis in the US is likely to be judged as the most wrenching since 
the end of the Second World War.  It will end eventually when home prices stabilize and 
with them the value of equity in homes supporting troubled mortgage securities.  
 
Of course, this is not a date certain.  It is likely also to be most dependent upon, if not more fully 
determined by, when the mortgage foreclosure crisis begins to end. Most forecasts of that date 
are late in 2008 or in 2009 because mortgage resets, contractual increases in payments whether 
interest rate remain the same or even fall somewhat, on most adjustable rate subprime loans are 
not expected to ease until then. A second critical factor for the end of the financial crisis is the 
continuation of rapid monetary aggregate growth with some pass-through to accelerated credit 
growth.  This is perhaps the most important factor in reversing the slowing in spending growth 
and in credit growth. Given the lag in monetary policy, the fact that it takes some time, perhaps 
six to nine months, before actions to accelerate the growth of money and credit begin to bear 
results in terms of higher spending and output, and the fact that monetary aggregates did not 
accelerate until January 2008, it is going to be awhile before the financial crisis can be laid to 
rest.  Political uncertainties, and uncertainties about the prospects for federal tax and spending 
increases underlying the current economic outlook, are also not likely to be resolved soon.       
 
The second prong of the foreclosure crisis, the financial industry effects, remains a threat to the 
overall economy’s performance.  Many analysts fear that a generalized collapse in confidence of 
lenders could lead to a recession.  Various industry leaders initially put the risk of recession at 
nearly a 50-50 bet.  For example, on September 27, 2007, Richard Syron, CEO of Freddie Mac, 
warned that the housing market downturn had led to a 40-45 percent chance of recession.  Alan 
Greenspan in December 2007 put the risk at 50 percent. Subsequently, most analysts and an even 
higher percentage of the public came to believe that the economy was, or soon would be, in a 
recession.  Moreover, the recognition that the foreclosure peak would come later in 2008 or in 
2009 led many to conclude that the recession would last at least through the end of 2008. 
  
Forecasting the size of the future spike in foreclosures is difficult.  There is only limited 
experience with nontraditional loans and subprime loans.  Subprime (and alt-A and other high 
risk) loans are about 30 percent of all mortgages.  At worst, in early 2002, foreclosures on 
subprime loans hit about 9 percent. A somewhat higher peak of about 12 percent with the now-
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larger share of subprime loans could mean that subprime foreclosures alone could raise the 
overall foreclosure rate by 3.5 percentage points.  With the remainder running slightly above 
normal, say around one percent, the overall foreclosure rate would reach about 4.25 percent, 
almost twice the current rate and the highest since the Mortgage Bankers Association began 
collecting data. It is not implausible that the foreclosure rate on subprime loans could be far 
worse, say double the 2002 level, or 18 percent.  In that case, the overall foreclosure rate would 
reach about 7 percent. Such levels would mean about 2 million to 3.2 million home loans in 
foreclosure at the peak, two to three times the number at the end of 2007, and this would have 
serious consequences for the housing industry, housing prices and, at the top end, for the 
economy. 
  
An overall foreclosure rate of 4 percent to 7 percent for 2008 would represent, at most, about 
$400 to $700 billion. Virtually all losses on these mortgages accrue to lenders and they in turn 
typically lose up to half the value of the mortgage. So the losses to lenders could mount to $200 
to $350 billion. As of the end of the first quarter of 2008, all insured institutions have taken loss 
provisions of $105.6 in 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, but a similar amount has been 
registered over the same period by UBS and six large losers in Europe. Thus it is possible that 
banks, in the aggregate, have already replaced capital matching the lion’s share of losses and that 
over the next 12 to 18 months, loss provisions are not likely to rise much or banks could even 
recapture some excess provisions. But banks do not hold most of these mortgages, either in the 
United States or abroad. Moreover, the worst-case loss on foreclosed mortgage loans is not a 
large number relative to the size of annual growth in wealth, debt and lending, nor is the 
consequent loss of capital a severe constraint on lending and credit, as some analysts have 
suggested. Besides, capital-constrained lenders can readily reduce investments to boost loans as 
price signals in competitive markets will instruct them to do. Some estimates indicate that banks 
have already raised enough capital to offset the capital losses they expect, in the aggregate. At 
the end of the third quarter of 2007, banks held about $4 trillion in residential mortgages ($2.2 
trillion), home equity loans ($0.6 trillion) and mortgage-backed securities ($1.2 trillion), which is 
about 30 percent of total banking assets, and 40 percent of mortgages. 
 
A loss of half on as many as 4 percent of mortgages and MBS securities would represent about 
1.2 percent of total assets and 12 percent of total equity. Recent estimates of the extent of 
increase in new bank capital indicate that bank capital has not been, and is not likely to be, 
reduced by this much, if at all, by losses on mortgage-related debt. None of the worst case 
figures, however, would pose a serious threat to lending or bank failure in an industry where 98 
percent of institutions surpass the highest regulatory capital standards, although some institutions 
with more concentrated exposure or worse default experience could fail. The banks’ core capital 
ratio or leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital to total assets) was 7.87 percent at the end of the third 
quarter 2007.  This is down only slightly from the 8.25 percent ratio registered at the end of 2006 
before the losses on mortgage related assets began.  A slight decline in this ratio that leaves the 
banking system in a strongly well capitalized position does not suggest that banks are 
constrained in their ability to make loans, although heightened risk sensitivity, a continuing slow 
monetary and credit expansion and the slowing economy are beginning to do so.     
  
Financial markets have exhibited considerable resiliency, but further adverse developments 
could lead to further turmoil. There is no credit crunch, only isolated and temporary market 
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effects that force credit markets to alter the channel of lending and borrowing and where greater 
awareness of and sensitivity to risk is priced into market interest rates. Unexpected shocks could 
disrupt the market recovery, especially because the foreclosure spike looms out in the future and 
its full extent and timing remains subject to some uncertainty.  Moreover, the effects of the 
foreclosure crisis come on the heels, perhaps in part due to, a sharp slowing in the growth of 
money and credit that began in 2006 and that had begun to slow growth before the foreclosure 
crisis.  Moreover these effects are being reinforced by an energy price shock that has been 
especially large over the past year.    
 
Fed actions in March 2008 provided a substitute to the Treasury Secretary’s aborted plan for a 
super-SIV by putting a floor under the prices of illiquid mortgage-related securities and their 
depressed prices.  The Fed approach is to allow these securities to be warehoused as collateral 
for liquid, high-quality government securities. To the extent that the securities are not needed, 
they can be loaned back to the Fed overnight as RPs.  Thus the liquidity problem is temporarily 
abated and the pressure on financial firms to sell these assets and take losses when prices are 
allowed to fall is avoided.  The problem with such a solution is that it ignores the pressures of the 
market place and the resolution of balance sheet problems in the financial system. By postponing 
necessary and inevitable market price adjustments, the plans make the adjustment problem 
longer and greater. Moreover, by creating a role for the Fed in the postponement of these 
adjustments, the Fed becomes a contributor to lengthening and worsening the financial crisis and 
risks its reputation as a central bank and national treasure.    
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